ThreadCount Community edition

Uniform stock management for healthcare linen rooms: the coordinator app, the phone counter and the staff app, for your own server. Built from a113353 on 2026-09-15. Licensed under the Functional Source License (FSL-1.1-ALv2).

app/api/auth/2fa/route.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,80 @@
+import { NextRequest, NextResponse } from "next/server";
+import { prisma } from "@/lib/db";
+import { cookies } from "next/headers";
+import { REMEMBER_MAX_AGE, pwVersion, setSessionCookie } from "@/lib/session";
+import { sameOriginJson } from "@/lib/csrf";
+import { allow, clientIp } from "@/lib/ratelimit";
+import { decryptSecret, hashRecoveryCode, totpVerify } from "@/lib/totp";
+import { TRUST_COOKIE, TRUST_TTL_MS, mintTrust, readTicket } from "@/lib/twofactor";
+import { recordAuthEvent } from "@/lib/audit";
+
+export const dynamic = "force-dynamic";
+
+/* Second step of sign-in: the code from the authenticator, or one recovery code.
+ *
+ * Rate limited hard. A six-digit code is one in a million per guess, which is only meaningful if
+ * guessing is expensive — unthrottled, a million tries is minutes of work. */
+export async function POST(req: NextRequest) {
+  const csrf = sameOriginJson(req);
+  if (csrf) return NextResponse.json({ error: csrf }, { status: 403 });
+
+  const ip = clientIp(req.headers);
+  let body: { ticket?: unknown; code?: unknown; trust?: unknown; remember?: unknown };
+  try { body = await req.json(); } catch { return NextResponse.json({ error: "Bad request" }, { status: 400 }); }
+
+  const t = readTicket(String(body.ticket ?? ""));
+  if (!t) return NextResponse.json({ error: "That sign-in has expired. Start again." }, { status: 400 });
+
+  // Per account and per address: one stolen ticket can't be brute-forced, and one machine can't
+  // work through several accounts at once.
+  if (!allow("2fa-user:" + t.uid, 10, 15 * 60 * 1000) || !allow("2fa-ip:" + ip, 300, 15 * 60 * 1000)) {
+    return NextResponse.json({ error: "Too many attempts — try again in a few minutes." }, { status: 429 });
+  }
+
+  const u = await prisma.user.findUnique({
+    where: { id: t.uid },
+    select: { id: true, facilityId: true, email: true, first: true, last: true, role: true, inactive: true, passwordHash: true, totpSecret: true, totpEnabledAt: true },
+  });
+  if (!u || u.inactive || !u.totpEnabledAt) {
+    return NextResponse.json({ error: "That sign-in has expired. Start again." }, { status: 400 });
+  }
+  // The password changed between the two steps — the ticket is stale for the same reason a session
+  // would be.
+  if (pwVersion(u.passwordHash) !== t.pv) {
+    return NextResponse.json({ error: "That sign-in has expired. Start again." }, { status: 400 });
+  }
+
+  const raw = String(body.code ?? "").trim();
+  const secret = decryptSecret(u.totpSecret);
+  let good = !!secret && totpVerify(secret, raw);
+  let usedRecovery = false;
+
+  if (!good && raw.replace(/[^A-Za-z0-9]/g, "").length >= 10) {
+    // A recovery code. Single use: consumed in the same conditional update that finds it, so two
+    // simultaneous attempts can't both spend it.
+    const hash = hashRecoveryCode(raw);
+    const hit = await prisma.recoveryCode.findFirst({ where: { userId: u.id, codeHash: hash, usedAt: null }, select: { id: true } });
+    if (hit) {
+      const consumed = await prisma.recoveryCode.updateMany({ where: { id: hit.id, usedAt: null }, data: { usedAt: new Date() } });
+      good = consumed.count === 1;
+      usedRecovery = good;
+    }
+  }
+
+  if (!good) return NextResponse.json({ error: "That code isn't right. Try the current one from your app." }, { status: 401 });
+
+  await setSessionCookie(u.id, u.passwordHash, false, body.remember === true ? REMEMBER_MAX_AGE : undefined);
+  // "Trust this computer": only ever set here, after a real code, never from the password step.
+  if (body.trust === true) {
+    const jar = await cookies();
+    jar.set(TRUST_COOKIE, mintTrust(u.id, pwVersion(u.passwordHash)), { httpOnly: true, sameSite: "lax", secure: process.env.NODE_ENV === "production", path: "/api/auth", maxAge: Math.floor(TRUST_TTL_MS / 1000) });
+  }
+  // How they got in matters more here than anywhere else: a recovery code means the phone is gone,
+  // and a run of them means something else is going on.
+  recordAuthEvent(
+    { facilityId: u.facilityId, userId: u.id, userName: `${u.first} ${u.last}`.trim() || u.email },
+    "auth:signin", ip, usedRecovery ? "recovery" : "totp",
+  );
+  const left = await prisma.recoveryCode.count({ where: { userId: u.id, usedAt: null } });
+  return NextResponse.json({ ok: true, name: `${u.first} ${u.last}`, role: u.role, usedRecovery, recoveryLeft: left });
+}

app/api/auth/forgot/route.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,80 @@
+import { NextRequest, NextResponse } from "next/server";
+import { prisma } from "@/lib/db";
+import { allow, clientIp, fail, over } from "@/lib/ratelimit";
+import { sameOriginJson } from "@/lib/csrf";
+import { verifyTurnstile } from "@/lib/turnstile";
+import { sendTo, transactionalConfigured } from "@/lib/mail";
+import { RESET_TTL_MS, newResetToken, resetEmail, resetUrl } from "@/lib/reset";
+
+export const dynamic = "force-dynamic";
+
+/* Request a password reset.
+ *
+ * Before this existed a facility whose only admin forgot their password was locked out for good —
+ * the sign-in screen told them to ask an admin, and they were the admin. Deleting the last admin
+ * deletes the whole facility, so there was no way back in at all.
+ *
+ * The response is identical whether or not the address has an account. Anything else turns this
+ * into a way to ask "does this hospital use ThreadCount, and is this person a coordinator there?"
+ */
+export async function POST(req: NextRequest) {
+  const csrf = sameOriginJson(req);
+  if (csrf) return NextResponse.json({ error: csrf }, { status: 403 });
+
+  const ip = clientIp(req.headers);
+  let body: { email?: unknown; cfToken?: unknown };
+  try { body = await req.json(); } catch { return NextResponse.json({ error: "Bad request" }, { status: 400 }); }
+  const email = String(body.email ?? "").trim().toLowerCase().slice(0, 160);
+
+  // A slow ceiling per IP, so one machine can't walk a staff list to find out which addresses exist
+  // by watching how long each request takes. The per-address ceiling deliberately lives further
+  // down, past the bot check — see the note beside it.
+  if (!allow("forgot-ip:" + ip, 60, 60 * 60 * 1000)) {
+    return NextResponse.json({ ok: true });
+  }
+
+  const cfErr = await verifyTurnstile(body.cfToken, ip);
+  if (cfErr) return NextResponse.json({ error: cfErr }, { status: 400 });
+
+  if (!/^[^\s@]+@[^\s@]+\.[^\s@]+$/.test(email)) return NextResponse.json({ ok: true });
+
+  const user = await prisma.user.findUnique({ where: { email }, select: { id: true, first: true, inactive: true, ssoBreakGlass: true, facility: { select: { ssoRequired: true } } } });
+  // A facility that requires single sign-on has no password door for most of its people, so a
+  // reset link would be a way round its identity provider. Break-glass admins keep theirs. The
+  // answer to the caller is the same either way.
+  const ssoOnly = !!user && user.facility.ssoRequired && !user.ssoBreakGlass;
+  if (user && !user.inactive && !ssoOnly) {
+    // The per-address ceiling counts mail actually sent, not requests received, and it is only
+    // consulted once the bot check has passed. Spent on requests, it handed a stranger a way to
+    // hold a facility's only coordinator out of their own account: four anonymous posts with no
+    // Turnstile token filled the bucket, and every later attempt by the coordinator was answered
+    // with "a reset link is on its way" and no mail. Counted this way the only way to exhaust the
+    // budget is to have four reset mails delivered to that same inbox, so whoever forgot their
+    // password always has a working link waiting for them.
+    const mailKey = "forgot-email:" + email;
+    if (over(mailKey, 4, 60 * 60 * 1000)) {
+      console.warn("[forgot] four reset mails already sent this hour — suppressing another for user", user.id);
+    } else {
+      const { token, tokenHash } = newResetToken();
+      await prisma.$transaction(async (tx) => {
+        // Asking again supersedes anything outstanding, so a forwarded older email goes dead.
+        await tx.passwordReset.updateMany({
+          where: { userId: user.id, usedAt: null },
+          data: { usedAt: new Date() },
+        });
+        await tx.passwordReset.create({
+          data: { userId: user.id, tokenHash, expiresAt: new Date(Date.now() + RESET_TTL_MS), requestIp: ip },
+        });
+      });
+      const { subject, text, html } = resetEmail(user.first, resetUrl(token));
+      const sent = await sendTo(email, subject, text, html);
+      // Only a mail that left the building counts. A send that failed gave the coordinator nothing,
+      // so charging them for it would shut them out for an hour over a mail outage.
+      if (sent) fail(mailKey, 60 * 60 * 1000);
+      else console.error("[forgot] reset requested but mail could not be sent for user", user.id);
+    }
+  }
+
+  // Told to the caller regardless, so the answer carries no information about the address.
+  return NextResponse.json({ ok: true, mail: transactionalConfigured() });
+}

app/api/auth/login/route.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,103 @@
+import { NextRequest, NextResponse } from "next/server";
+import bcrypt from "bcryptjs";
+import { prisma } from "@/lib/db";
+import { REMEMBER_MAX_AGE, pwVersion, setSessionCookie } from "@/lib/session";
+import { TRUST_COOKIE, mintTicket, readTrust } from "@/lib/twofactor";
+import { sameOriginJson } from "@/lib/csrf";
+import { clientIp, fail, over } from "@/lib/ratelimit";
+import { signInStaff } from "@/lib/staffauth";
+import { verifyTurnstile } from "@/lib/turnstile";
+import { recordAuthEvent } from "@/lib/audit";
+
+export const dynamic = "force-dynamic";
+
+// Simple in-memory throttle per IP+email (per process).
+const attempts = new Map<string, { n: number; t: number }>();
+
+/** The trail names the person, not the address they typed — see lib/audit.ts. */
+const actorFor = (u: { id: string; facilityId: string; first: string; last: string; email: string }) =>
+  ({ facilityId: u.facilityId, userId: u.id, userName: `${u.first} ${u.last}`.trim() || u.email });
+
+export async function POST(req: NextRequest) {
+  const csrf = sameOriginJson(req); if (csrf) return NextResponse.json({ error: csrf }, { status: 403 });
+  let body: { email?: string; password?: string; cfToken?: string; remember?: unknown };
+  try { body = await req.json(); } catch { return NextResponse.json({ error: "Bad request" }, { status: 400 }); }
+  const email = String(body.email || "").trim().toLowerCase().slice(0, 160);
+  const password = String(body.password || "").slice(0, 200);
+  // Spray protection independent of the per-(ip,email) counter below. Both buckets count only the
+  // attempts that FAILED — a whole hospital signs in from one NAT address at shift change, and a
+  // ceiling on attempts would have to lock that ward out to be worth anything against an attacker.
+  const ipKey = clientIp(req.headers);
+  if (over("login-ip:" + ipKey, 40, 15 * 60 * 1000) || (email && over("login-email:" + email, 25, 15 * 60 * 1000))) return NextResponse.json({ error: "Too many attempts — try again in 15 minutes." }, { status: 429 });
+  if (!email || !password) return NextResponse.json({ error: "Enter your email and password." }, { status: 400 });
+
+  // nginx appends the real client IP last; earlier entries are client-supplied and spoofable.
+  const xff = req.headers.get("x-forwarded-for")?.split(",").map((x) => x.trim()).filter(Boolean) || [];
+  const ip = xff[xff.length - 1] || "local";
+  if (attempts.size > 5000) for (const [kk, v] of attempts) if (Date.now() - v.t > 15 * 60 * 1000) attempts.delete(kk);
+  const k = `${ip}|${email}`;
+  const a = attempts.get(k);
+  if (a && a.n >= 8 && Date.now() - a.t < 15 * 60 * 1000) return NextResponse.json({ error: "Too many attempts — try again in 15 minutes." }, { status: 429 });
+
+  const cfErr = await verifyTurnstile(body.cfToken, ipKey); if (cfErr) return NextResponse.json({ error: cfErr }, { status: 400 });
+  const u = await prisma.user.findUnique({ where: { email } });
+  /* One box, both kinds of account.
+   *
+   * A wearer reaches the product the way anyone else does — the home page, then Log in — and types
+   * the details they set up in the staff app. So when this address has no coordinator account, the
+   * register is asked before the answer is called wrong.
+   *
+   * A coordinator account always wins: it is the one with the counter, the orders and the register
+   * behind it, and a coordinator who also wears a uniform can open their own record from inside the
+   * app. One address therefore has one destination, every time.
+   *
+   * This is a lookup, not a second attempt. "Try the coordinator, and if that fails try the staff
+   * one" would score a failure against every single staff sign-in, and these ceilings count
+   * failures — behind one hospital's NAT address at shift change that is a locked-out ward.
+   */
+  if (!u) {
+    const s = await signInStaff(email, password, ipKey, false);
+    if (s.kind === "ok") return NextResponse.json({ ok: true, name: s.name, staff: true });
+    if (s.kind === "error") return NextResponse.json({ error: s.error }, { status: s.status });
+    // `none`: no staff account either, so this falls through to the answer below, which counts the
+    // failure once and says the same thing it has always said.
+  }
+  const ok = u ? await bcrypt.compare(password, u.passwordHash) : await bcrypt.compare(password, "$2b$12$C6UzMDM.H6dfI/f/IKcEeO5x3FvDS3kqB6r0Jt3g7Lz0vX4o0JZ1u");
+  if (!u || !ok) {
+    attempts.set(k, { n: (a && Date.now() - a.t < 15 * 60 * 1000 ? a.n : 0) + 1, t: Date.now() });
+    fail("login-ip:" + ipKey, 15 * 60 * 1000);
+    if (email) fail("login-email:" + email, 15 * 60 * 1000);
+    // An address with no account here is recorded nowhere: there is no facility to file it under,
+    // and a log of attempts on addresses that don't exist would be a list of other people's email
+    // addresses that nobody asked us to keep.
+    if (u) recordAuthEvent(actorFor(u), "auth:signin.failed", ipKey);
+    return NextResponse.json({ error: "Email or password doesn’t match." }, { status: 401 });
+  }
+  attempts.delete(k);
+  if (u.inactive) {
+    // The right password on an account that has been taken away is worth knowing about.
+    recordAuthEvent(actorFor(u), "auth:signin.refused", ipKey, "inactive");
+    return NextResponse.json({ error: "This account has been deactivated. Ask an admin at your facility to reactivate it." }, { status: 403 });
+  }
+  const fac = await prisma.facility.findUnique({ where: { id: u.facilityId }, select: { isDemo: true, ssoEnabled: true, ssoRequired: true } });
+  if (fac?.isDemo) return NextResponse.json({ error: "Demo accounts can’t log in here — open the demo from the home page." }, { status: 403 });
+  // The facility has decided its people sign in through its own identity provider. The password
+  // was right, and it is still refused — except for the admin the facility keeps as its fire
+  // escape. The box sends them on to single sign-on rather than reporting a failure.
+  if (fac?.ssoEnabled && fac.ssoRequired && !u.ssoBreakGlass) {
+    recordAuthEvent(actorFor(u), "auth:signin.refused", ipKey, "sso required");
+    return NextResponse.json({ error: "Your facility signs in with single sign-on.", ssoRequired: true }, { status: 403 });
+  }
+  // With a second factor on the account the password alone opens nothing. The ticket says only
+  // "this password was correct", is accepted by no other endpoint, and expires in five minutes.
+  // A browser that entered a code within the last thirty days and asked to be trusted skips it;
+  // the trust token is bound to the password version, so a changed password asks again.
+  const trusted = !!u.totpEnabledAt && readTrust(req.cookies.get(TRUST_COOKIE)?.value, u.id, pwVersion(u.passwordHash));
+  if (u.totpEnabledAt && !trusted) {
+    return NextResponse.json({ need2fa: true, ticket: mintTicket(u.id, pwVersion(u.passwordHash)) });
+  }
+
+  await setSessionCookie(u.id, u.passwordHash, false, body.remember === true ? REMEMBER_MAX_AGE : undefined);
+  recordAuthEvent(actorFor(u), "auth:signin", ipKey, trusted ? "password+trusted" : "password");
+  return NextResponse.json({ ok: true, name: `${u.first} ${u.last}`, role: u.role });
+}

app/api/auth/logout/route.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,22 @@
+import { NextRequest, NextResponse } from "next/server";
+import { clearSessionCookie, currentUser } from "@/lib/session";
+import { sameOriginJson } from "@/lib/csrf";
+import { clientIp } from "@/lib/ratelimit";
+import { recordAuthEvent } from "@/lib/audit";
+
+export const dynamic = "force-dynamic";
+
+export async function POST(req: NextRequest) {
+  const csrf = sameOriginJson(req, false); if (csrf) return NextResponse.json({ error: csrf }, { status: 403 });
+  // Read the session before dropping it, so the trail can say who left. An unauthenticated call
+  // still clears the cookie and still answers ok — signing out must never fail.
+  const user = await currentUser();
+  await clearSessionCookie();
+  if (user) {
+    recordAuthEvent(
+      { facilityId: user.facilityId, userId: user.id, userName: `${user.first} ${user.last}`.trim() || user.email },
+      "auth:signout", clientIp(req.headers),
+    );
+  }
+  return NextResponse.json({ ok: true });
+}

app/api/auth/lookup/route.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,28 @@
+import { NextRequest, NextResponse } from "next/server";
+import { prisma } from "@/lib/db";
+import { sameOriginJson } from "@/lib/csrf";
+import { allow, clientIp } from "@/lib/ratelimit";
+
+export const dynamic = "force-dynamic";
+
+/* Which door does this address belong at?
+ *
+ * The sign-in screen asks for the address first and only then shows a password box, a single
+ * sign-on button or a pointer to the staff app. This answers the last of those: an address that
+ * has no coordinator account but does have a staff-app account belongs in the staff app, and
+ * telling the person so beats a "wrong password" they can never get past. It answers nothing about
+ * coordinator accounts — a coordinator address and an unknown address get the same reply, so the
+ * box cannot be used to test which addresses have one. Throttled per connection like the SSO lookup. */
+export async function POST(req: NextRequest) {
+  const csrf = sameOriginJson(req);
+  if (csrf) return NextResponse.json({ error: csrf }, { status: 403 });
+  if (!allow("lookup:" + clientIp(req.headers), 60, 15 * 60 * 1000)) return NextResponse.json({ staff: false });
+  let body: { email?: unknown };
+  try { body = await req.json(); } catch { return NextResponse.json({ error: "Bad request" }, { status: 400 }); }
+  const email = String(body.email ?? "").trim().toLowerCase().slice(0, 160);
+  if (!/^[^\s@]+@[^\s@]+\.[^\s@]+$/.test(email)) return NextResponse.json({ staff: false });
+  const user = await prisma.user.findUnique({ where: { email }, select: { id: true } });
+  if (user) return NextResponse.json({ staff: false });
+  const acc = await prisma.staffAccount.findUnique({ where: { email }, select: { id: true } });
+  return NextResponse.json({ staff: !!acc });
+}

app/api/auth/reset/route.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,96 @@
+import { NextRequest, NextResponse } from "next/server";
+import bcrypt from "bcryptjs";
+import { prisma } from "@/lib/db";
+import { allow, clientIp } from "@/lib/ratelimit";
+import { sameOriginJson } from "@/lib/csrf";
+import { pwVersion, setSessionCookie } from "@/lib/session";
+import { mintTicket } from "@/lib/twofactor";
+import { hashResetToken } from "@/lib/reset";
+import { recordAuthEvent } from "@/lib/audit";
+
+export const dynamic = "force-dynamic";
+
+const MIN_PASSWORD = 8;
+
+/* Complete a password reset.
+ *
+ * Changing the hash invalidates every existing session for that user on its own — the session
+ * cookie carries a version derived from the password hash — so a reset also kicks out whoever
+ * prompted it, which is the behaviour you want if the reason was a shared or stolen password. */
+export async function POST(req: NextRequest) {
+  const csrf = sameOriginJson(req);
+  if (csrf) return NextResponse.json({ error: csrf }, { status: 403 });
+
+  const ip = clientIp(req.headers);
+  if (!allow("reset-ip:" + ip, 100, 60 * 60 * 1000)) {
+    return NextResponse.json({ error: "Too many attempts — try again later." }, { status: 429 });
+  }
+
+  let body: { token?: unknown; password?: unknown };
+  try { body = await req.json(); } catch { return NextResponse.json({ error: "Bad request" }, { status: 400 }); }
+  const token = String(body.token ?? "").trim().slice(0, 400);
+  const password = String(body.password ?? "");
+
+  if (!token) return NextResponse.json({ error: "That link is incomplete. Ask for a new one." }, { status: 400 });
+  if (password.length < MIN_PASSWORD) {
+    return NextResponse.json({ error: `Use at least ${MIN_PASSWORD} characters.` }, { status: 400 });
+  }
+
+  // Looked up by hash, so the raw token never has to be compared against stored material.
+  const row = await prisma.passwordReset.findUnique({
+    where: { tokenHash: hashResetToken(token) },
+    select: {
+      id: true, userId: true, expiresAt: true, usedAt: true,
+      user: { select: { inactive: true, passwordHash: true, totpEnabledAt: true, facilityId: true, first: true, last: true, email: true } },
+    },
+  });
+
+  const dead = !row || row.usedAt || row.expiresAt.getTime() < Date.now() || row.user.inactive;
+  if (dead) {
+    return NextResponse.json({ error: "That link has expired or has already been used. Ask for a new one." }, { status: 400 });
+  }
+
+  const hash = await bcrypt.hash(password, 12);
+  await prisma.$transaction(async (tx) => {
+    // Consume the token in the same write as the password change, so a double submit can't set the
+    // password twice or leave a live token behind.
+    const consumed = await tx.passwordReset.updateMany({
+      where: { id: row.id, usedAt: null },
+      data: { usedAt: new Date() },
+    });
+    if (consumed.count !== 1) throw new Error("token already consumed");
+    await tx.user.update({ where: { id: row.userId }, data: { passwordHash: hash } });
+    // Any other outstanding requests for this account die with it.
+    await tx.passwordReset.updateMany({ where: { userId: row.userId, usedAt: null }, data: { usedAt: new Date() } });
+  }).catch(() => null);
+
+  const fresh = await prisma.user.findUnique({ where: { id: row.userId }, select: { passwordHash: true } });
+  if (!fresh || fresh.passwordHash !== hash) {
+    return NextResponse.json({ error: "That link has expired or has already been used. Ask for a new one." }, { status: 400 });
+  }
+
+  const actor = {
+    facilityId: row.user.facilityId,
+    userId: row.userId,
+    userName: [row.user.first, row.user.last].filter(Boolean).join(" ").trim() || row.user.email,
+  };
+
+  // A second factor is a second factor here too. Control of the mailbox is one proof, and on an
+  // account with TOTP the front door refuses to open on one proof — so this door must not either,
+  // or resetting the password would be the supported way around the authenticator, and the new
+  // password would then be enough to turn it off for good.
+  //
+  // The same five-minute ticket the sign-in screen uses, accepted by the same endpoint: nothing new
+  // to keep, nothing new to get wrong.
+  if (row.user.totpEnabledAt) {
+    recordAuthEvent(actor, "auth:password.reset", ip, "email-link");
+    return NextResponse.json({ need2fa: true, ticket: mintTicket(row.userId, pwVersion(hash)) });
+  }
+
+  // Otherwise sign them straight in: they have just proven control of the mailbox and chosen a
+  // password, and making them type it again immediately is friction with no security value.
+  await setSessionCookie(row.userId, hash);
+  recordAuthEvent(actor, "auth:password.reset", ip, "email-link");
+  recordAuthEvent(actor, "auth:signin", ip, "reset");
+  return NextResponse.json({ ok: true });
+}

app/api/auth/signup/route.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,100 @@
+import { NextRequest, NextResponse } from "next/server";
+import bcrypt from "bcryptjs";
+import { prisma } from "@/lib/db";
+import { setSessionCookie } from "@/lib/session";
+import { allow, clientIp } from "@/lib/ratelimit";
+import { sameOriginJson } from "@/lib/csrf";
+import { verifyTurnstile } from "@/lib/turnstile";
+import { sendTo, transactionalConfigured } from "@/lib/mail";
+import { switches } from "@/lib/switches";
+import { alertNewSignup } from "@/lib/ops/alerts";
+import { recordAuthEvent } from "@/lib/audit";
+import { TRIAL_DAYS } from "@/lib/plan";
+import { sendBillingMail, templates } from "@/lib/billing-mail";
+import { welcomeEmail } from "@/lib/accountmail";
+
+export const dynamic = "force-dynamic";
+
+/* Starting staff groups by healthcare setting. Generic titles only — every room renames them. */
+const GROUP_SEEDS: Record<string, { staffGroups: string[]; nursingGroups: string[]; kitGroups: string[] }> = {
+  hospital: { staffGroups: ["Registered Nurse", "Enrolled Nurse", "Allied Health", "Support Services", "Security"], nursingGroups: ["Registered Nurse", "Enrolled Nurse"], kitGroups: ["Support Services"] },
+  aged_care: { staffGroups: ["Registered Nurse", "Enrolled Nurse", "Personal Care Worker", "Hospitality", "Maintenance"], nursingGroups: ["Registered Nurse", "Enrolled Nurse"], kitGroups: ["Hospitality", "Maintenance"] },
+  community: { staffGroups: ["Registered Nurse", "Enrolled Nurse", "Allied Health", "Administration"], nursingGroups: ["Registered Nurse", "Enrolled Nurse"], kitGroups: ["Administration"] },
+};
+const STATE_ZONES: Record<string, string> = {
+  QLD: "Australia/Brisbane", NSW: "Australia/Sydney", ACT: "Australia/Sydney", VIC: "Australia/Melbourne", TAS: "Australia/Hobart",
+  SA: "Australia/Adelaide", NT: "Australia/Darwin", WA: "Australia/Perth", NZ: "Pacific/Auckland",
+};
+
+/* Creating a facility.
+ *
+ * The address typed here is not verified, and deliberately isn't: a confirmation step in front of
+ * a linen room's first ten minutes is a wall, and a facility half-created behind an unclicked link
+ * is worse than one created. But it is the *only* way back in — /api/auth/forgot answers a
+ * stranger and the owner identically, so a typo produces no signal at all until the day the
+ * password is forgotten, and by then the facility is unreachable and undeletable.
+ *
+ * So the address is exercised immediately instead. A note goes to it saying, in as many words,
+ * that this is the address that recovers the account, and the answer here says whether it was
+ * sent — which is what lets the sign-up screen show the address back and tell someone who never
+ * receives it what to do about it while they are still signed in and can still act.
+ */
+
+export async function POST(req: NextRequest) {
+  const sw = await switches();
+  if (!sw.signupsOpen) return NextResponse.json({ error: "New facility sign-ups are closed." }, { status: 403 });
+  const csrf = sameOriginJson(req); if (csrf) return NextResponse.json({ error: csrf }, { status: 403 });
+  if (!allow("signup:" + clientIp(req.headers), 5, 60 * 60 * 1000)) return NextResponse.json({ error: "Too many sign-ups from this connection — try again later." }, { status: 429 });
+  let b: Record<string, string>;
+  try { b = await req.json(); } catch { return NextResponse.json({ error: "Bad request" }, { status: 400 }); }
+  const first = String(b.first || "").trim().slice(0, 80), last = String(b.last || "").trim().slice(0, 80);
+  const facility = String(b.facility || "").trim().slice(0, 120);
+  const email = String(b.email || "").trim().toLowerCase().slice(0, 160);
+  const password = String(b.password || "");
+  if (!first || !last || !facility) return NextResponse.json({ error: "Name and facility are required." }, { status: 400 });
+  if (!/^[^\s@]+@[^\s@]+\.[^\s@]+$/.test(email)) return NextResponse.json({ error: "Enter a valid work email." }, { status: 400 });
+  if (password.length < 8) return NextResponse.json({ error: "Password must be at least 8 characters." }, { status: 400 });
+  const cfErr = await verifyTurnstile(b.cfToken, clientIp(req.headers)); if (cfErr) return NextResponse.json({ error: cfErr }, { status: 400 });
+  if (await prisma.user.findUnique({ where: { email } })) return NextResponse.json({ error: "That email already has an account — log in instead." }, { status: 409 });
+
+  const u = await prisma.$transaction(async (tx) => {
+    // No staff groups: the facility names its own. Any list handed over here would be one employer's
+    // organisation chart on another employer's register, and a group sitting on a route nobody
+    // chose decides who is handed a starting kit. Both route lists start empty with it, so until the
+    // coordinator puts a group on the FTE table or the starting kit, everybody is on manager approval
+    // and nobody has been promised a kit the counter would not hand over.
+    // Until plans are live the page still says free, so a facility created today is grandfathered:
+    // free with everything, for good. Once they are live a new room starts on the plan it chose —
+    // Hosted Small, free, or a Hosted Facility trial with its end date set now. Anything else
+    // sent as `plan` is Hosted Small: the free room is the safe misreading.
+    const trial = sw.plansLive && b.plan === "hosted_facility";
+    const planData = !sw.plansLive
+      ? { grandfathered: true, planStatus: "free" }
+      : trial
+        ? { plan: "hosted_facility", planStatus: "trial", trialEndsAt: new Date(Date.now() + TRIAL_DAYS * 86_400_000) }
+        : { plan: "hosted_small", planStatus: "free" };
+    // Two optional answers from the sign-up screen. The setting seeds the staff groups the room
+    // starts with (renamed or removed freely under Settings); the state sets the time zone counts
+    // and month-end are read in. Neither is required, and "other"/blank leaves the old defaults.
+    const seed = GROUP_SEEDS[String(b.setting || "")] || {};
+    const timezone = STATE_ZONES[String(b.state || "").toUpperCase()];
+    const f = await tx.facility.create({ data: { name: facility, coordinator: `${first} ${last}`, ...planData, ...seed, ...(timezone ? { timezone } : {}) } });
+    return tx.user.create({ data: { facilityId: f.id, email, passwordHash: await bcrypt.hash(password, 12), first, last, title: "Uniform Coordinator", role: "ADMIN" } });
+  });
+  await setSessionCookie(u.id, u.passwordHash);
+  recordAuthEvent({ facilityId: u.facilityId, userId: u.id, userName: `${first} ${last}`.trim() || email }, "auth:signup", clientIp(req.headers));
+  alertNewSignup({ id: u.facilityId, name: facility }); // the facility's name only — never the person
+
+  const em = welcomeEmail(first, facility);
+  const mailed = await sendTo(email, em.subject, em.text, em.html);
+  // A room on a trial also gets the trial letter: what the 30 days include, when they end, and
+  // that no card was taken. Not awaited — the welcome above is the one sign-up waits for.
+  void (async () => {
+    const f = await prisma.facility.findUnique({ where: { id: u.facilityId }, select: { planStatus: true, trialEndsAt: true } });
+    if (f?.planStatus === "trial" && f.trialEndsAt) await sendBillingMail(u.facilityId, (ctx) => templates.trialStarted(ctx, { first, endsAt: f.trialEndsAt }));
+  })();
+  if (!mailed && transactionalConfigured()) console.error("[signup] welcome mail could not be sent for user", u.id);
+  // `mailed` is false when no SMTP is configured at all, which is a different thing from a bad
+  // address — the screen says so rather than pretending the address has been proven.
+  return NextResponse.json({ ok: true, email, mailed, mail: transactionalConfigured() });
+}