ThreadCount Community edition

Uniform stock management for healthcare linen rooms. Licensed under the GNU AGPL v3.

app/api/ops/auth/login/route.ts

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+import { NextRequest, NextResponse } from "next/server";
+import bcrypt from "bcryptjs";
+import { prisma } from "@/lib/db";
+import { sameOriginJson } from "@/lib/csrf";
+import { clientIp, fail, over } from "@/lib/ratelimit";
+import { setOpsCookie, logOperatorEvent } from "@/lib/ops/session";
+import { verifyOperatorCode } from "@/lib/ops/totp";
+import { hashRecoveryCode } from "@/lib/totp";
+
+export const dynamic = "force-dynamic";
+
+/* The break-glass door for the operations console.
+ *
+ * Single sign-on is the front door. This is the fire escape, and a fire escape must not depend
+ * on the thing that is on fire — so there is no Turnstile here. The sitekey is bound to the
+ * product's domain and compiled in at build time; on this hostname it would refuse with a
+ * generic "security check failed", discovered during the exact incident this route exists for.
+ *
+ * Instead: failures are counted under the console's own buckets. Not `login-ip:` — that is the
+ * product's, and a public credential-stuffing run against coordinator accounts must not be able
+ * to lock the operator out of the console. The limits are tighter than the product's because
+ * there is one operator, not a ward arriving at shift change.
+ *
+ * ⛔ This route mints an OPERATOR session and nothing else. It must never call setSessionCookie
+ * or setStaffCookie; an operator signing in as a customer is the data plane by another door. */
+
+// A constant to compare against when there is no such operator, so a missing address and a
+// wrong password take the same time.
+const DUMMY = "$2b$12$C6UzMDM.H6dfI/f/IKcEeO5x3FvDS3kqB6r0Jt3g7Lz0vX4o0JZ1u";
+const WINDOW = 15 * 60 * 1000;
+
+export async function POST(req: NextRequest) {
+  const csrf = sameOriginJson(req);
+  if (csrf) return NextResponse.json({ error: csrf }, { status: 403 });
+
+  let body: { email?: unknown; password?: unknown; code?: unknown };
+  try { body = await req.json(); } catch { return NextResponse.json({ error: "Bad request" }, { status: 400 }); }
+  const email = String(body.email ?? "").trim().toLowerCase().slice(0, 160);
+  const password = String(body.password ?? "").slice(0, 200);
+  const code = body.code === undefined || body.code === null ? "" : String(body.code).slice(0, 16);
+
+  const ip = clientIp(req.headers);
+  if (over("ops-login-ip:" + ip, 20, WINDOW) || (email && over("ops-login-email:" + email, 10, WINDOW))) {
+    return NextResponse.json({ error: "Too many attempts — try again in 15 minutes." }, { status: 429 });
+  }
+  if (!email || !password) return NextResponse.json({ error: "Enter your email and password." }, { status: 400 });
+
+  const op = await prisma.operator.findUnique({
+    where: { email },
+    select: { id: true, name: true, passwordHash: true, inactive: true, totpSecret: true, totpEnabledAt: true },
+  });
+  const ok = await bcrypt.compare(password, op?.passwordHash ?? DUMMY);
+  if (!op || !ok) {
+    fail("ops-login-ip:" + ip, WINDOW);
+    if (email) fail("ops-login-email:" + email, WINDOW);
+    if (op) logOperatorEvent({ operatorId: op.id, action: "ops:signin.failed", detail: "password", ip });
+    return NextResponse.json({ error: "Email or password doesn’t match." }, { status: 401 });
+  }
+  if (op.inactive) {
+    logOperatorEvent({ operatorId: op.id, action: "ops:signin.refused", detail: "inactive", ip });
+    return NextResponse.json({ error: "This operator account has been deactivated." }, { status: 403 });
+  }
+
+  // Once a second factor is enrolled, the password alone opens nothing. `needCode` tells the form
+  // to ask for it; a wrong code is a counted failure like a wrong password.
+  let second = "";
+  if (op.totpEnabledAt) {
+    if (!code) return NextResponse.json({ error: "Enter the code from your authenticator app.", needCode: true }, { status: 401 });
+    // Ten or more letters and digits is a recovery code; six digits is an authenticator code — the
+    // same heuristic as the coordinator door. A recovery code is spent in the same conditional
+    // update that finds it, so it cannot be used twice, and a spent or unknown one is a counted
+    // failure like any other.
+    const looksRecovery = code.replace(/[^A-Za-z0-9]/g, "").length >= 10;
+    if (looksRecovery) {
+      const spent = await prisma.operatorRecoveryCode.updateMany({
+        where: { operatorId: op.id, codeHash: hashRecoveryCode(code), usedAt: null },
+        data: { usedAt: new Date() },
+      });
+      if (spent.count !== 1) {
+        fail("ops-login-ip:" + ip, WINDOW);
+        fail("ops-login-email:" + email, WINDOW);
+        logOperatorEvent({ operatorId: op.id, action: "ops:signin.failed", detail: "recovery", ip });
+        return NextResponse.json({ error: "That recovery code isn’t right, or has already been used.", needCode: true }, { status: 401 });
+      }
+      second = "recovery";
+    } else if (!verifyOperatorCode(op, code)) {
+      fail("ops-login-ip:" + ip, WINDOW);
+      fail("ops-login-email:" + email, WINDOW);
+      logOperatorEvent({ operatorId: op.id, action: "ops:signin.failed", detail: "totp", ip });
+      return NextResponse.json({ error: "That code isn’t right.", needCode: true }, { status: 401 });
+    } else {
+      second = "totp";
+    }
+  }
+
+  await prisma.operator.update({ where: { id: op.id }, data: { lastSeenAt: new Date() } });
+  await setOpsCookie(op.id, op.passwordHash, false);
+  logOperatorEvent({ operatorId: op.id, action: "ops:signin", detail: second ? `password+${second}` : "password", ip });
+  return NextResponse.json({ ok: true, name: op.name });
+}

app/api/ops/auth/logout/route.ts

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+import { NextRequest, NextResponse } from "next/server";
+import { clientIp } from "@/lib/ratelimit";
+import { clearOpsCookie, currentOperator, logOperatorEvent } from "@/lib/ops/session";
+
+export const dynamic = "force-dynamic";
+
+/* Ends the operator session. Reached by a plain form post from the console, so it answers with a
+ * redirect rather than JSON. Recorded in the trail when there was a session to end. */
+export async function POST(req: NextRequest) {
+  const op = await currentOperator();
+  if (op) logOperatorEvent({ operatorId: op.id, action: "ops:signout", ip: clientIp(req.headers) });
+  await clearOpsCookie();
+  const url = req.nextUrl.clone();
+  url.pathname = "/ops/login"; url.search = "";
+  return NextResponse.redirect(url, { status: 303 });
+}

app/api/ops/auth/sso/route.ts

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+import { NextRequest, NextResponse } from "next/server";
+import { prisma } from "@/lib/db";
+import { clientIp } from "@/lib/ratelimit";
+import { safeOpsNext, verifyAccessJwt } from "@/lib/ops/cfAccess";
+import { logOperatorEvent, setOpsCookie } from "@/lib/ops/session";
+
+export const dynamic = "force-dynamic";
+
+/* Single sign-on entry. Reached when a browser arrives with a Cloudflare Access assertion but no
+ * operator session (the sign-in page hands off here). The assertion is verified fail-closed
+ * (lib/ops/cfAccess.ts), the verified email is mapped to an EXISTING, ACTIVE operator, and the
+ * ordinary tc_ops session is minted, marked `sso`. Never creates an operator: an email Access
+ * admits but the console does not know falls back to the password door. Every failure lands on
+ * /ops/login?sso=failed — never a bypass, never a loop (the sign-in page does not re-trigger SSO
+ * when ?sso is present).
+ *
+ * Relative Location on purpose: an absolute URL built from the request would carry the origin
+ * nginx sees (127.0.0.1:3000), not the public host. */
+function seeOther(location: string): NextResponse {
+  return new NextResponse(null, { status: 303, headers: { Location: location } });
+}
+
+export async function GET(req: NextRequest) {
+  const failed = seeOther("/ops/login?sso=failed");
+  const next = safeOpsNext(req.nextUrl.searchParams.get("next"));
+  const ip = clientIp(req.headers);
+
+  const email = await verifyAccessJwt(req.headers.get("cf-access-jwt-assertion"));
+  if (!email) return failed;
+
+  const op = await prisma.operator.findUnique({
+    where: { email },
+    select: { id: true, inactive: true, passwordHash: true },
+  });
+  if (!op || op.inactive) {
+    // The trail cannot name an operator it does not have; the address goes in the detail, since
+    // "who Access let in that the console refused" is the fact worth keeping.
+    console.warn("[ops sso] no active operator for", email, "from", ip);
+    return failed;
+  }
+
+  await setOpsCookie(op.id, op.passwordHash, true);
+  logOperatorEvent({ operatorId: op.id, action: "ops:signin.sso", ip });
+  prisma.operator.update({ where: { id: op.id }, data: { lastSeenAt: new Date() } }).catch(() => {});
+  return seeOther(next);
+}

app/api/ops/auth/totp/route.ts

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+import { NextRequest, NextResponse } from "next/server";
+import bcrypt from "bcryptjs";
+import QRCode from "qrcode";
+import { prisma } from "@/lib/db";
+import { sameOriginJson } from "@/lib/csrf";
+import { allow, clientIp } from "@/lib/ratelimit";
+import { hashRecoveryCode, newRecoveryCodes, newTotpSecret, otpauthUrl, totpVerify } from "@/lib/totp";
+import { currentOperator, logOperatorEvent } from "@/lib/ops/session";
+import { decryptOpsSecret, encryptOpsSecret } from "@/lib/ops/totp";
+
+export const dynamic = "force-dynamic";
+
+/* An operator's second factor: the same three steps as a coordinator's (app/api/2fa/route.ts),
+ * for the same reason — a secret stored the moment it is generated leaves an account
+ * half-enrolled if the person never finishes, and their next sign-in asks for codes from an app
+ * they never set up.
+ *
+ *   setup      — generate a secret and show the QR. Stored, but not yet in force.
+ *   enable     — prove a code from it works, switch it on, hand back recovery codes once.
+ *   disable    — password required; turning a factor off is a privileged act.
+ *   regenerate — password required; new recovery codes, old ones gone.
+ *
+ * The secret is encrypted under the console's own key (lib/ops/totp.ts), never the product's.
+ * The QR is generated here as SVG, as the product does it: the secret never has to be handed to
+ * client-side code to render. */
+export async function GET() {
+  const op = await currentOperator();
+  if (!op) return NextResponse.json({ error: "Not signed in" }, { status: 401 });
+  const left = await prisma.operatorRecoveryCode.count({ where: { operatorId: op.id, usedAt: null } });
+  return NextResponse.json({ enabled: op.totpEnabled, recoveryLeft: left, viaSso: op.viaSso });
+}
+
+export async function POST(req: NextRequest) {
+  const csrf = sameOriginJson(req);
+  if (csrf) return NextResponse.json({ error: csrf }, { status: 403 });
+  const op = await currentOperator();
+  if (!op) return NextResponse.json({ error: "Not signed in" }, { status: 401 });
+
+  const ip = clientIp(req.headers);
+  if (!allow("ops-2fa-manage:" + op.id, 30, 15 * 60 * 1000)) {
+    return NextResponse.json({ error: "Too many attempts — try again in a few minutes." }, { status: 429 });
+  }
+
+  let body: { action?: unknown; code?: unknown; password?: unknown };
+  try { body = await req.json(); } catch { return NextResponse.json({ error: "Bad request" }, { status: 400 }); }
+  const action = String(body.action ?? "");
+
+  const o = await prisma.operator.findUnique({
+    where: { id: op.id },
+    select: { id: true, email: true, passwordHash: true, totpSecret: true, totpEnabledAt: true },
+  });
+  if (!o) return NextResponse.json({ error: "Not signed in" }, { status: 401 });
+
+  if (action === "setup") {
+    if (o.totpEnabledAt) return NextResponse.json({ error: "Two-factor is already on for this account." }, { status: 400 });
+    const secret = newTotpSecret();
+    await prisma.operator.update({ where: { id: o.id }, data: { totpSecret: encryptOpsSecret(secret) } });
+    const url = otpauthUrl(secret, o.email, "ThreadCount ops");
+    const qr = await QRCode.toString(url, { type: "svg", margin: 1, width: 220, errorCorrectionLevel: "M" });
+    logOperatorEvent({ operatorId: o.id, action: "ops:2fa.setup", ip });
+    return NextResponse.json({ ok: true, secret, url, qr });
+  }
+
+  if (action === "enable") {
+    if (o.totpEnabledAt) return NextResponse.json({ error: "Two-factor is already on." }, { status: 400 });
+    const secret = decryptOpsSecret(o.totpSecret);
+    if (!secret) return NextResponse.json({ error: "Start the setup again." }, { status: 400 });
+    if (!totpVerify(secret, String(body.code ?? "").replace(/\s+/g, ""))) {
+      return NextResponse.json({ error: "That code isn't right. Use the current one from your app." }, { status: 400 });
+    }
+    const codes = newRecoveryCodes();
+    await prisma.$transaction(async (tx) => {
+      await tx.operator.update({ where: { id: o.id }, data: { totpEnabledAt: new Date() } });
+      await tx.operatorRecoveryCode.deleteMany({ where: { operatorId: o.id } });
+      await tx.operatorRecoveryCode.createMany({ data: codes.map((c) => ({ operatorId: o.id, codeHash: hashRecoveryCode(c) })) });
+    });
+    logOperatorEvent({ operatorId: o.id, action: "ops:2fa.enable", ip });
+    // The only time these are ever readable. Stored hashed, so there is no second chance.
+    return NextResponse.json({ ok: true, codes });
+  }
+
+  if (action === "disable") {
+    if (!o.totpEnabledAt) return NextResponse.json({ ok: true });
+    const pw = String(body.password ?? "");
+    if (!pw || !(await bcrypt.compare(pw, o.passwordHash))) {
+      return NextResponse.json({ error: "That password isn't right." }, { status: 401 });
+    }
+    await prisma.$transaction(async (tx) => {
+      await tx.operator.update({ where: { id: o.id }, data: { totpEnabledAt: null, totpSecret: "" } });
+      await tx.operatorRecoveryCode.deleteMany({ where: { operatorId: o.id } });
+    });
+    logOperatorEvent({ operatorId: o.id, action: "ops:2fa.disable", ip });
+    return NextResponse.json({ ok: true });
+  }
+
+  if (action === "regenerate") {
+    if (!o.totpEnabledAt) return NextResponse.json({ error: "Two-factor isn't on." }, { status: 400 });
+    const pw = String(body.password ?? "");
+    if (!pw || !(await bcrypt.compare(pw, o.passwordHash))) {
+      return NextResponse.json({ error: "That password isn't right." }, { status: 401 });
+    }
+    const codes = newRecoveryCodes();
+    await prisma.$transaction(async (tx) => {
+      await tx.operatorRecoveryCode.deleteMany({ where: { operatorId: o.id } });
+      await tx.operatorRecoveryCode.createMany({ data: codes.map((c) => ({ operatorId: o.id, codeHash: hashRecoveryCode(c) })) });
+    });
+    logOperatorEvent({ operatorId: o.id, action: "ops:2fa.regenerate", ip });
+    return NextResponse.json({ ok: true, codes });
+  }
+
+  return NextResponse.json({ error: "Unknown action" }, { status: 400 });
+}